Abstract. We present a decision-theoretic analysis of an agent's understanding of the interdependencies in her choices. We provide the foundations for a simple and flexible model that allows the misperception of correlated risks. We introduce a framework in which the decision maker chooses a portfolio of assets among which she may misperceive the joint returns, and present simple axioms equivalent to a representation in which she attaches a probability to each possible joint distribution over returns and then maximizes subjective expected utility using her (possibly misspecified) beliefs.
Introduction
Many risky decisions, such as constructing a portfolio of securities, involve the interaction of many distinct variables, the correlation among which may be missed or misunderstood. The issue of misperception of correlated risks has recently acquired a renewed prominence, as authors such as Brunnermeier (2009) , Coval et al. (2009) , Hellwig (2009) , and, more informally, Lewis (2010) , have examined the significance of the inadequate understanding of correlations and the resulting mispricing of assets for the events surrounding the financial crisis in 2008. We present a decision-theoretic analysis of a decision maker's understanding of the interdependencies in her choices.
Our aim is to provide the foundations of a simple and flexible model that represents misperception of correlated outcomes in a intuitive manner.
1
Our analysis departs from the standard device of modeling the decision maker (DM) as choosing among individual, mutually exclusive alternatives. Instead, we propose a framework that explicitly considers her preferences over portfolios of assets, or more generally, profiles of actions. The DM's comparisons of portfolios allow us to define "misperception" of an uncertain environment in a very simple and straightforward way: misperception occurs when she is not indifferent between two different portfolios that "objectively" always result in the same outcomes. Unlike the standard model, our framework allows the DM to express a strict preference between owning a portfolio of the 500 underlying stocks of the S&P 500 (in the right proportions) and owning an S&P 500 index-tracking fund even with no transaction costs. We identify the DM's misperception of the correlation among the stocks of the S&P 500 when indifference between the portfolio and the tracking fund fails.
2
We propose a model of decisions that maintains the classic assumptions of subjective expected utility but for those that conflict with the DM's possibly incorrect perception of correlation. Our main result describes the behavioral regularities necessary and sufficient for representing a DM who assigns probabilistic beliefs to correlations and maximizes expected utility. The next section provides a simple illustration of our setting as well as the new assumptions, and then describes our main conclusions.
1.1. Illustration and overview. The basic primitives of our model, formally described in Section 2, are a set of states, a set of assets, and a preference relation over portfolios of assets. Each asset a returns a real number a(ω) in state ω. A portfolio is a finite collection of assets, denoted by a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n , that yields a payoff equal to the sum of the returns of all the underlying assets. The total return of a portfolio a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n in state ω is n i=1 a i (ω). The set of states thus describes the "objective" or "correct" structure of joint returns, i.e. the objectively possible returns of every profile. If a DM understands that returns have this structure, then her beliefs over the set of states fully describe her beliefs over portfolio returns.
The DM's preference over portfolios reveals when she does not understand the structure of returns; for instance, if she strictly prefers the index fund to its underlying stocks. More concretely, fix any two assets b and c and consider a third asset a satisfying a(ω) = b(ω) + c(ω) for every state ω. The profiles b, c and a give the same return in every state, so one expects that a DM who understands the objective structure of returns would be indifferent between b, c and a . In the language of decision theory, such indifference is implied by the standard Monotonicity axiom: state-by-state dominance by one portfolio implies a preference for it. However, if she misperceives the correlation between b and c, then she may have a strict preference for one or the other, e.g. b, c a . To formalize our opening quote, if a is one triple-B-rated subprime bond and b, c is a portfolio with two halves of similar bonds in a synthetic CDO, then a DM may strictly prefer b, c to a , believing it to be significantly less risky despite the default of these bonds being "driven by the same broader economic forces."
As a DM may violate Monotonicity for a number of reasons, we propose a novel "Weak Monotonicity" axiom that limits her violations to those directly attributable to misperception of correlation. Deferring a formal statement to Section 3, it roughly requires that whenever one portfolio always yields a better outcome than a second for every conceivable correlation between their returns, she prefers the first to the second. Thus, we can attribute a given violation of Monotonicity to the DM believing that a particular joint realization of returns, possibly inconsistent with the objective structure of returns, is sufficiently likely. We show that a DM whose behavior satisfies Weak Monotonicity as well as the other axioms of expected utility acts as if she forms beliefs about the correlation between assets and then maximizes expected utility. We represent her choices by specifying beliefs on an enlarged state space, rich enough to express any perceived correlation between assets. For instance, our model explains the agent's preference for the synthetic CDO b, c over the bond a by assigning positive probability to b and c being less than perfectly correlated.
Our DM can also be represented as if she ranks portfolios according to a seemingly ad hoc yet intuitive procedure, which we call a probabilistic correlation representation or PCR. First, the assets are divided into understanding classes. The DM chooses as if she correctly understands the structure of returns for the assets within an understanding class. For instance, with assets a, b, and c as above, she is indifferent between b, c and a when all are in the same class, whereas a strict preference indicates that at least one of the assets belongs to a different class than the others. Second, she forms beliefs about the correlation between classes of assets. Formally, beliefs are defined on a multi-dimensional state space where each dimension corresponds to a class -if two assets belong to the same understanding class, then they depend on the same coordinate. Finally, the DM maximizes subjective expected utility with these beliefs. In addition to providing a parsimonious and intuitive model of decisions, the PCR permits a tight connection between parameters and behavior. With enough diversity in each class, we show the existence of a unique collection of understanding classes corresponding tightly to the DM's accuracy of perception of joint occurrences and, for generic risk preferences, uniqueness of beliefs. A brief discussion of some simple yet significant implications of our model for asset pricing and, in particular, for the evaluation of complex securities with tranching such as CDO's concludes are analysis.
1.2. Related Literature. Misperception of correlations is a broad concept that has been studied in various guises, ranging from the limited understanding of patterns, as in Piccione and Rubinstein (2003) , Eyster and Piccione (2013) , and Levy and Razin (2015a) , to the inability to derive some logical implications (Lipman, 1999) . Evidence of misperception of correlations has been found in several experimental studies such as Eyster and Weizsäcker (2010) , Enke and Zimmerman (2013) , and Rubinstein and Salant (2015) . In particular contexts, misperception of correlation has been shown to lead to a range of behaviors, including social influence (DeMarzo et al., 2003) , overconfidence (Ortoleva and Snowberg, 2015) , and polarization (Levy and Razin, 2015b) . When applied to incomplete information games, our framework nests the behavior in solution concepts such as Cursed Equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) and Analogy Based Expectations Equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005; Jehiel and Koessler, 2008) . A key feature of our approach is that, being based on preferences, it is neutral with respect to the psychological biases and limitations that cause agents to perceive correlations incorrectly.
Framing can also be viewed as a proximate reason for misperception: different framings of the same action can make understanding correlations harder; see Example 1. More fittingly, different portfolios that yield the same outcomes can be viewed as different framings that affect the DM's choices. Choice theoretic works that highlight other aspects of framing include Salant and Rubinstein (2008) who study the conditions under which choice data can be rationalized as resulting from choice from a menu under different frames, and Ahn and Ergin (2010) who axiomatize a formal model where the framing of an act affects the probabilities used by the DM.
Our results also relate to a body of literature on boundedly rational choice theory. Lipman (1999) introduces a decision-theoretic model for relating an agent's logic to preferences. Al-Najjar et al. (2003) explicitly model the effects of complex environments on decision making as a preference for flexibility. Kochov (2015) develops a model of a DM with imperfect foresight, which can be interpreted as misperception of the auto-correlation between actions, where failure of Monotonicity also plays a role. Lastly, our representation can admit an interpretation in which different, endogenous sources of uncertainty (the understanding classes) determine beliefs, as in Chew and Sagi (2008) or Gul and Pesendorfer (2015) . Esponda (2008) , Spiegler (2015) , and Levy and Razin (2016) have developed approaches to misperception that are motivated by similar behavioral insights, but that do not in general admit PCR representations. In the first two, the DM forms her perception as a "fixed point", permitting the marginal distribution of a fixed payoffrelevant variable (such as the other player's strategy) to be affected by her own choice. In the last, the DM has ambiguity about the correlations and thus violates our Independence axiom.
Primitives
There is a set A of actions, with typical elements a, a i , b, b i .
3 Each action results in an outcome or consequence in X = R, with typical elements x, y, z. This outcome is determined by a state of the world drawn from the finite set Ω. 4 We interpret the state space Ω as a description of the "objectively possible" joint realizations of the outcomes of any set of actions, against which the DM's subjective perceptions of joint realizations are evaluated. A map ρ : A × Ω → X describes the relationship between actions, states, and outcomes, with the action a yielding the outcome ρ(a, ω) in state ω. Slightly abusing notation, we write a(ω) for ρ (a, ω) . Note that we allow for distinct actions a and b with a(ω) = b(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω. Thus, each action implicitly includes a description that can affect how its relationship with other actions is understood; for instance, a and b could yield outcomes that depend on temperature, where a is described in Fahrenheit and b in Celsius, as in Example 1 below. We assume that A includes every constant action, i.e. for any x ∈ X there is an action, also denoted by x, yielding the outcome x for every state in Ω. We write σ(a) (σ(a, b)) for the coarsest σ-algebra by which a is (both a and b are) measurable.
From the set of actions, we derive a set F of action profiles (or profiles). Each element of F is a finite vector of actions for which the order does not matter -i.e., a multiset of actions. This allows the agent to take the same action multiple times, such as buying many shares of the same security while making irrelevant where an asset is listed in the description of a portfolio. A profile that consists of taking the n actions a 1 , ..., a n is denoted a 1 , ..., a n or a i n i=1 . To save notation, we do not write out the index when the number of actions is unimportant, i.e. we write a i instead of a i n i=1 . An agent who chooses the profile a i n i=1 receives the outcomes of all n actions a 1 , ..., a n , that is, she receives n i=1 a i (ω) is state ω. We emphasize one key difference in interpretation from the menu-choice literature (Kreps, 1979; Dekel et al., 2001; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001) : the agent receives all of the actions in her chosen profile and does not make a second choice from the profile at a later point in time.
Our goal is to provide a simple and intuitive model of decisions among action profiles, starting from axioms on preferences. To this end, we adopt the widely used approach popularized by Anscombe and Aumann (1963) of expanding the set of alternatives to incorporate lotteries with objective probabilities. Specifically, the DM chooses among probability distributions over F having finite support, the set of which we denote by ∆F, rather than among profiles in F. A typical element of ∆F is p = (p 1 , a 1 i ; ...; p n , a occurs with probability p m , and we write p( a i ) > 0 for a profile a i in the support of p. We discuss the reasons for including lotteries in our setup in Remark 1 and their role in the proofs in Remark 3, which can be skipped without any loss of continuity.
The DM chooses by maximizing a preference relation over ∆F, with the symbol ∼ denoting indifference and strict preference. Naturally, the profile a i n i=1 in F corresponds to the lottery in ∆F in which a i n i=1 has probability equal to one, and lotteries over X to lotteries over profiles containing a single, constant action. In this manner, ∆F "contains" both all profiles and all lotteries over X. Remark 1. As first shown by Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , lotteries with objective probabilities facilitate the elicitation of subjective beliefs and utility by "convexifying" the choice domain, that is, by turning it into a mixture space. The most widely used procedure for generating a mixture space, introduced by Fishburn (1970) , places additional structure on the outcome space to which actions map, usually lotteries over the original outcome space X; that is, horse race-roulette actions in which the roulette wheel is spun after the race ends. Thus, a mixture of actions becomes equivalent to an action that mixes among outcomes. In our paper, we adopt instead the reverse order while maintaining the original outcome space: the wheel is spun before running the race. As pointed out by Kreps (1988) and shown by Battigalli et al. (2013) in a setting with actions (but not profiles), the latter approach is equivalent to the former one when it includes an appropriate, yet less elegant, monotonicity axiom that explicitly rather than implicitly incorporates reduction of compound uncertainty.
5 In our setting, spinning the wheel first provides a natural way of mixing profiles that avoids thorny issues of interpretation. In particular, as the identities of the actions in a mixture are central to our model, establishing an exogenous equivalence between a mixture and another action imposes ad hoc restrictions on how the joint realizations of the actions involved are understood.
Foundations
We first introduce some standard assumptions. We then move to the key axioms of our approach.
3.1. Standard Assumptions. Given two lotteries p, q ∈ ∆F, a mixture αp + (1 − α)q, α ∈ [0, 1], is the lottery in ∆F in which the probability of each profile in the support of p and q is determined by compounding the probabilities in the obvious way.
Axiom 1 (Weak order). The preference relation is complete and transitive. These are classic axioms and their interpretation is standard. While one may plausibly argue that the DM's misperception does or should cause violations of some of them, we show that a meaningful and rich model of decisions can be constructed when they hold. In fact, most commonly used models featuring misperception do not violate any of them. 
. We return to Monotonicity in Section 5.1; the following example illustrates the type of violations this paper is concerned with. A DM who expresses the preference 100 b C , b F contradicts Monotonicity: both b C , b F and 100 yield 100 in every state. Our novel axiom, Weak Monotonicity, relaxes this property by considering objectively impossible joint realizations of outcomes that would be possible with alternative joint distributions. To motivate it, consider why a DM might prefer 100 to b C , b F . She can "plausibly" conceive four possible joint realizations of b C , b F : (100, 0), (0, 100), (0, 0), (100, 100). If the DM prefers 100 to b C , b F , then she must think it is sufficiently likely that both bets return 0. Weak Monotonicity subsumes such considerations by strengthening the conditions under which a lottery dominates another. In particular, it requires that if the lottery over the outcomes generated by p is preferred to that generated by q for every "plausibly" conceived joint realizations of the outcomes of the actions in the supports, then p q.
Formally, for any finite subset of actions {c 1 , ..., c n } = C ⊂ A, the set of all plausible realizations of C equals 
in which the constant action yielding the outcome
), i.e. the probability of the profile to which the outcome is assigned. The lottery induced by q, denoted q x , is defined and interpreted similarly. Note that given a plausible realization x of p and q, if an action a occurs in both p and q, then its outcome is x a in both induced lotteries.
For example, suppose that p randomizes equally between b C , b F and b F and q selects b F with certainty. For the plausible realizations (100, 0) and (100, 100), p induces a lottery that randomizes equally between two outcomes (100 and 0 in the first plausible realization, 200 and 100 in the second) while q induces a lottery that selects the worse of the two outcomes with certainty (0 and 100, respectively). Similarly, for the plausible realizations (0, 100) and (0, 0) p and q induce identical lotteries that yield with certainty 100 in the first plausible realization and 0 in the second.
As each realization corresponds to an outcome of the lottery under some joint distribution, these induced lotteries provide a natural way to compare p and q. When the lottery induced by p is preferred to that induced by q for each plausible realization, then p is better than q for any possible joint distribution. Weak Monotonicity relates this comparison to preference in the natural way.
Axiom 4 (Weak Monotonicity). For any p, q ∈ ∆F, if p x q x for every plausible realization x of p and q, then p q.
In words, if the DM prefers the lottery induced by p better than to that induced by q for any of their plausible realizations, then she prefers p to q. If she prefers larger payoffs, then it reduces to the following two implications when comparing a, b with c . First, min a + min b ≥ max c implies a, b c . Second, min c ≥ max a + max b implies c a, b . Neither implication has bite when comparing b C , b F with 100 , so Weak Monotonicity does not restrict the ranking of these two profiles.
Remark 2. Weak Monotonicity has some formal similarities with the Dominance axiom of Seo (2009) . Roughly, Seo's axiom states that for two compound lotteries over acts, if the compound lottery generated by the first is better than the second for any subjective probability distribution over states, then the first is preferred to the second. As in our axiom, it considers all possible beliefs, though over Ω rather than over plausible realizations. Seo's explicitly does not require reduction of compound lotteries, while ours explicitly assumes reduction. The Mixed Consequentialism axiom in Battigalli et al. (2013) is also related, but only considers the outcomes that are possible according to Ω.
3.3. Understanding and Richness. The above axioms suffice for our representation theorems but not for the identification of basic parameters of the model such as the DM's beliefs. To this end, our final assumption relies on identifying the DM's understanding of correlations among actions and ensures that there exist sufficiently diverse and understood sets of actions.
Our definition of understanding extends the logic of Weak Monotonicity. A DM who perceives the correlations within a subset of the actions correctly rules out some plausible realizations. Specifically, if she understands the correlations of the actions in a set C, then she should consider irrelevant any plausible realization of p and q that fails to "synchronize" the outcomes for the actions in C as for the joint occurrences that are determined by Ω. That is, she should only consider a plausible realization x if there exists ω ∈ Ω such that x a = a(ω) for all a ∈ C; we call any such plausible
We say that the DM understands C if C-synchronous plausible realizations suffice to determine her preference.
Definition 1. The preference understands C ⊆ A if for any p, q ∈ ∆F, p q whenever p x q x for all C-synchronous plausible realizations x of p and q.
In order to identify the main parameters of our representations, we assume that each action belongs to a suitably diverse, understood set of actions. A sufficient condition is that this understood set is rich, defined as follows.
Thus, a rich set containing bets on the events E and F contains all possible bets on E, F , E F and E F . For two polar examples, a set containing an action for every possible mapping between states and outcomes is rich, but a singleton set is never rich. We can now state our assumption.
Assumption 1 (Non-Singularity). Each a ∈ A belongs to a rich, understood subset of actions.
Non-Singularity is in the spirit of the Savage (1954) assumption that the domain of preference contains all possible acts. It is a joint assumption on both the preference and the set A.
Representation
A DM who violates Monotonicity acts as if she perceives uncertainty that is not entirely captured by the state space Ω. Under our axioms, we derive a state space sufficiently rich to express any additional uncertainty resulting from the misperception of the joint realizations of outcomes, and show that the DM acts as if maximizing expected utility on this enriched state space. While one can plausibly increase the dimensionality of uncertainty in many ways, we do so by considering multiple copies of the state space.
4.1. Basic Correlation Representation. Our first result shows that, under Axioms 1-4, one can obtain a basic representation in which each action is assigned its own copy. This representation is sufficiently flexible to encompass a wide variety of subjective perceptions of correlation. In particular, it can explain choices such as 100 b C , b F in Example 1 by assigning positive probability to b C and b F simultaneously returning 0.
To state our first representation formally, we introduce some notation. Let Ω A =
a∈A Ω be the Cartesian product where one copy of Ω is assigned to each action in A, Σ A = ⊗ a∈A σ (a) be the product σ-algebra for Ω A , Ω a be the copy of Ω assigned to a ∈ A, and for any ω ∈ Ω A , ω a be the component of ω in Ω a .
Definition 3. The preference relation has a basic correlation representation if there exist a utility index u : X → R and a probability measure π over Σ A such that p q if and only if U (p) ≥ U (q) where
By increasing the dimension of uncertainty, the DM acts as if she is an expected utility maximizer on the larger state space Ω A . Every ω ∈ Ω A determines a joint realization of the outcomes of the corresponding actions, so all additional uncertainty corresponds to the perception of correlations. In Example 1, the objective state space is the temperature τ , regardless of whether it is expressed in Celsius or Fahrenheit, but in a basic correlation representation, the DM's state space is instead a vector of temperatures, one for each action. The action b C is assigned to one "copy" of the set of temperatures, and b F to another. Then, the utility of the profile
which can, of course, be different from u (100). In particular, this representation allows the DM to attach positive probability to events such as "b C yields 0 and b F yields 0" that cannot occur if all uncertainty is captured by Ω. The next theorem shows that, under our axioms, such representation always exists. We now outline the proof. Observe that our axioms imply the standard expected utility axioms when restricted to lotteries over outcomes, so, for standard lotteries, the preference has an expected utility representation with utility index u. Recall that a state ω ∈ Ω A assigns to each action a its "own" state ω a ∈ Ω and outcome a(ω a ). In the key step, we map each lottery p over profiles to a vector f p where ) to be the utility of a lottery over X that exhibits indifference with p. Independence then yields that F is linear, so standard results ensure that F can be written as an integral with respect to a probability measure.
Remark 3. Adaptations of our axioms are necessary, but not sufficient, when we define over F instead of ∆F. However Independence, which establishes a linear and thus separable representation, is not defined in the absence of lotteries. The formulation of alternative axioms needed to restore the lost properties remains an open question. o C is a constant act that pays $100, and since both bets use Celsius temperatures, it is reasonable to presume that the DM perceives it so. Nevertheless, in our basic representation, the action b o C is also assigned its own copy of the set of temperatures.
For the remainder of the paper, we consider a probabilistic correlation representation (PCR) of the preference, that is equivalent to the basic representation but has a more frugal state space. In addition to being easy to apply and interpret in many situations, it allows us to provide a tighter characterization of the parameters of the model such as the DM's beliefs. A PCR envisages the DM as implementing following procedure. She first groups together certain actions, the correlations among which she understands as per Definition 1. We call such a set of actions an understanding class and the set of all understanding classes a correlation cover. She then forms beliefs within and across classes, which we model as a probability measure on a product state space indexed by the understanding classes. All the actions in the same class are assigned to the same copy of Ω, so the possible joint realizations within a class are identical to the objective ones. Consequently, any profile of the actions in the same class reduces to a single action. Of course, this procedure is only a representational device. The resulting classes are endogenously revealed from her choices; indeed, the DM is not necessarily aware which of the joint realizations are understood by her are "objective" and which are "perceived".
Formally, the representation of a PCR is as follows. A correlation cover U is a collection of subsets of A such that U covers A and no C ∈ U contains a distinct C ∈ U. Beliefs are defined on Ω U = C∈U Ω, with the C-coordinate denoted by Ω C , endowed with the product σ-algebra Σ U = ⊗ C∈U Σ C where for each C ∈ U, Σ C is the coarsest σ-algebra by which every a ∈ C is measurable. Given a state ω ∈ Ω U , ω C denotes the component of ω assigned to C.
Definition 4. The preference has a probabilistic correlation representation (U, π, u) for a correlation cover U, a probability measure π over Σ U , and a utility index u :
where
for any a j n j=1 and C 1 , ..., C n ∈ U with a j ∈ C j for j = 1, ..., n.
While the PCR may seem a rather ad hoc procedure for implementing choice, it is easily seen to be equivalent to the basic correlation representation. Since the PCR places no restrictions on the understanding classes, any basic representation can be rewritten as a PCR, and vice versa.
6 To illustrate the PCR using Example 1, suppose 
The notion of PCR is crucial for the unique identification of beliefs because many actions can be allocated to the same dimension. When understanding classes contain suitably diverse actions, one can tease out DM's perception of correlation; this is impossible in the basic representation because each action has its own dimension. Hence, we restrict attention to rich PCRs: (U, π, u) is rich if every C ∈ U is a rich set. Rich PCRs arise in many natural applications; see Section 4.3.
6 The basic representation is a PCR where each understanding class is a singleton, and the converse follows from extending the probability measure from Ω U to Ω A . See online appendix for details.
Rich PCRs also permit the characterization of the correlation covers that are consistent with the DM's preference. Such a characterization is critical for the study of comparative notions of understanding, such as an increase or a decrease in the misperception for a DM or heterogeneity in misperception. The basic representation provides one extreme in terms of dimensionality: every action has its own understanding class. A PCR allows us to determine the other extreme by asking if and when a coarsest grouping of actions into understanding classes exists. Such a coarsest correlation cover pins down rather unequivocally the DM's misperceptions of joint realizations.
Definition 5. A collection U of subsets of A is the coarsest correlation cover for the preference if there is a rich PCR (U, π, u) of , and for any rich PCR (U , π , u ) of and any B ∈ U , B ⊆ B for some B ∈ U.
For any understanding class in a correlation cover U , there is a larger class in the coarsest cover. Therefore, any accurate perception captured by U is also captured by the coarsest cover. Obviously, the coarsest correlation cover, should it exist, is unique.
We can now present our main identification result, which relies on the utility index u being continuous, as implied by a standard axiom (Grandmont, 1972) , and NonSingularity. (U, π, u) . Furthermore, there exists a coarsest correlation cover, and π is unique if u is not a polynomial.
Theorem 2. The preference has a basic correlation representation with continuous u and Non-Singularity holds if and only if it has a rich PCR
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Theorem 2 shows that when u is continuous, Non-Singularity and Axioms 1-4 hold if and only if a rich PCR exists, and that a rich PCR exists if and only if a coarsest correlation cover exists. Since the coarsest cover is unique, a minimal state space can be meaningfully defined and, unless the utility is polynomial, beliefs on this space are uniquely identified. When the utility is polynomial, uniqueness typically fails: for instance, a risk-neutral DM's beliefs about the expected return of each asset suffice to determine her behavior, so only her marginal beliefs are unique. In general, the curvature of u determines precisely which beliefs affect the agent's behavior, and for many standard utilities such as CARA or CRRA, beliefs are unique. In the online appendix, we give a behavioral characterization of a polynomial utility index and identify the set of all beliefs consistent with a given rich PCR.
We note here that a coarsest correlation cover need not be a partition. In fact, a coarsest correlation cover is a partition only if it has exactly one understand class and the DM understands the relation among all actions. To see why, observe that each understanding class can always be enlarged to include all constant actions; thus, if the coarsest correlation cover is a partition, it can only have one cell. More interestingly, consider once more Example 1. Suppose that the DM knows that 0
• C = 32
• F but is unsure about the scaling factor; that is, she understands the connection between any actions that only depend on whether or not the temperature is below freezing. Any such action can belong to both understanding classes, regardless of being expressed in Celsius or Fahrenheit. We close this section by addressing some interpretive issues. Our framework implicitly assumes that the description of an asset is included in its formalization. In particular, a DM can perceive different framings of the same object as distinct assets -say two differently worded insurance contracts that are otherwise identical. Nevertheless, the descriptions of the individual assets must be sufficient for her perception of the returns of a profile. In a PCR, any additional information the DM acquires about the returns of a profile must be consistently incorporated into her beliefs about the joint returns of the underlying assets. For instance, let us return to a DM who strictly prefers an S&P 500 index-tracking fund to a portfolio of the stocks of the S&P 500. If we inform the DM that the portfolio and the index fund are actually identical, we would expect her to become indifferent. Our model can accommodate such indifference only by adjusting her beliefs about the correlations. Of course, this is a demanding requirement in the presence of misperception of the correlations among the underlying stocks.
The endogenous association of each action with a class and the unique determination of a coarsest set of classes are key advantages of our approach. One could, of course, begin by specifying a set of classes U and considering all acts on Ω U . However, this would require setting the relevant dimensions of uncertainty and their association with alternatives exogenously. Furthermore, it would require that DM expresses preferences over some possibly nonsensical acts that are inconsistent with the primitive profiles.
Applications of the PCR.
The following examples illustrates some natural applications of our representation.
4.3.1. Framing. Each action consists of a (Savage) act a and a frame f ∈ F, such as Celsius or Fahrenheit. The DM understands the connection between any acts framed in the same way. We can model this as a PCR where the correlation cover consists of the sets B f = {(a, f ) : a ∈ H}, where H is the set of all acts.
Imperfect inference in incomplete information games.
The PCR framework can be easily adapted to strategic environments (see Ellis and Piccione (2016) the set of all derivatives that depend on the same underlying asset, then she has a PCR when A = G × A o , for G equal to all functions from X to X, and the correlation cover consists of the sets
Source preference. Each action is associated with a source S i from a set S.
Each S i is a sub-σ-algebra of Σ and corresponds to a set of actions B i expressed in terms of the source. The correlation cover consists of all sets B i , so the DM reduces any profile whose contents depend on the same source to one act but fails to do so when it depends on more than one source.
Discussion
We conclude by considering some special cases and by discussing some of the implications of our model in the context of portfolio choice. 5.1. Special Cases. In this subsection, we consider two special cases of particular interest. For simplicity of exposition, we maintain throughout that σ-algebra of each understanding class is the power set. It is easy to adapt Theorem 2 to show existence of such a representation by strengthening appropriately our definition of a rich set in the Non-Singularity assumption.
Weak Monotonicity may be too permissive in some circumstances. In particular, it allows the DM to perceive differently the distribution of two actions with identical mappings from Ω to X. This is undesirable if the DM evaluates the distribution of individual actions consistently and misperceives only their correlation. For instance, a ratings agency may accurately evaluate the chances of any given asset defaulting but misjudge the likelihood of joint defaults. The axiom below yields that beliefs over the outcomes of individual actions are consistent with the objective state space.
Axiom 5 (Simple Monotonicity). If a(ω)
Simple Monotonicity implies that the DM's belief about the distribution of Ω does not depend on the action being evaluated. Formally, the preference has a representation in the following class. Define π C as the marginal over the copy of Ω assigned to class C.
Definition 6. A rich PCR (U, π, u) has consistent marginal beliefs if
This specification obtains in most cited models of imperfect inference.
Proposition 1. Let the preference have a rich PCR (U, π, u) with non-constant u.

Then, satisfies Simple Monotonicity if and only if its PCR has consistent marginal beliefs.
Proof. For sufficiency, suppose has a rich PCR (U, π, u) and satisfies Simple Monotonicity. Pick x, y ∈ X with u(x) > u(y). By richness, for any ω ∈ Ω and C 1 , C 2 ∈ U, there exists a i ∈ C i that yields x at state ω and y otherwise for i = 1, 2. By Simple
and thus π C 1 (ω) = π C 1 (ω). Necessity is trivial. Unsurprisingly, our model collapses to the standard expected utility model if and only if the preference satisfies the typical Monotonicity condition. For completeness, we state and prove this formally.
Axiom 6 (Monotonicity). For any profiles a
i n i=1 and b i m i=1 , if n i=1 a i (ω) m i=1 b i (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, then a i n i=1 b i m i=1 .
Proposition 2. Suppose has a rich PCR (U, π, u). The preference satisfies Monotonicity if and only if its coarsest correlation cover equals {A}.
Proof. Suppose has a rich PCR (U, π, u) . Pick any C ∈ U and for any profile a j n j=1 choose a ∈ C satisfying a(ω) = n j=1 a i (ω) for all ω. Then, a ∼ a j n j=1 by Monotonicity, which implies that
Thus, has a rich PCR ({A}, π C , u) , and {A} is the coarsest correlation cover.
Implications.
A DM with a fixed risk attitude simultaneously undervalues certain profiles while overvaluing others. For a very simple example, consider a strictly risk-averse trader who has a rich PCR with consistent marginal beliefs. Fix assets a, b, c so that
∈ E, and suppose that b, c ∼ 0. This indifference reveals that b and c are in the same understanding class. It is easy to see that whenever this trader misperceives the joint realizations of a, b , she overvalues a, b and undervalues a, c relative to a standard trader with the same beliefs: for a, b risk is smoothed out since a return equal to one is perceived as possible, whereas a, c is not perceived as riskless.
Independence requires that the DM is unsophisticated about her misperception. To illustrate this, consider the same trader and actions a, b, c as above, and suppose again that b and c are in the same understanding class while a is not. Thus, she misperceives the relationship between a and b as well as between a and c. A sophisticated trader may recognize her own lack of understanding. As in the ambiguity aversion literature, she may express the preference
a, c is "safer" than either alternative in that it offers a 50-50 lottery regardless of the correlation across classes; for instance, the DM studied by Levy and Razin (2016) would express such a preference. Obviously, the Independence axiom fails to hold. A full study of such behavior is left to future work.
A trader in our model typically perceives markets as incomplete, even when they are objectively complete. This can lead the agent to exhibit a flight to safety. Consider a simple asset market with one trader who divides fixed wealth w between three assets {a 1 , a 2 , a S }, whose returns are governed by two states S = {s 1 , s 2 } according to the return matrix
for columns a 1 , a 2 , a S and rows s 1 , s 2 . This maps naturally into our formal setting, with a typical action corresponding to buying x shares of security a i for x ∈ R.
The above matrix has full rank, so markets are objectively complete. Indeed, a standard trader finds a S to be redundant and perceives no arbitrage if and only if the price of a S equals the sum of the prices of a 1 and a 2 ; she must express indifference between buying exactly x shares of a S and buying x shares of a 1 together with x shares of a 2 . Now assume the trader's preference has a PCR with consistent marginal beliefs and two understanding classes, one for buying shares of a 1 and the other for buying shares of a 2 . The PCR trader perceives the return matrix to bẽ
in states (from top to bottom) (s 1 , s 1 ), (s 1 , s 2 ), (s 2 , s 1 ), and (s 2 , s 2 ) . Our strictly-risk trader never purchases strictly positive quantities of both a 1 and a 2 if her belief has full support and the price of a S equals the sum of the prices of a 1 and a 2 .
Finally, we illustrate how incentives interact with correlation misperception by considering how tranching alters the perceived expected return of a CDO. If the CDO is untranched, then its expected return equals the sum of that of the underlying assets. Any two traders that agree on the expected value of each component asset also agree on the expected value of the untranched CDO, even if they disagree about the correlation between the assets. Their evaluations diverge, however, when a CDO is divided into tranches. Suppose, for instance, that returns are allocated to two tranches and that the senior tranche has a claim on the first y dollars of return while the junior receives the return of the CDO in excess of y. The expected returns of the junior and senior tranches are calculated using the utility indexes u J (x) = max{x − y, 0}
and u S (x) = min{x, y}. Since neither is a polynomial, Theorem 2 implies that all aspects of the joint distribution can in principle affect the valuation of the tranches: misperception of correlation can lead to an inaccurate assessment, even when each of the underlying assets is evaluated correctly. To demonstrate interesting additional implications and perform relevant comparative statics, consider a trader with a PCR ({C 
for some probability measure q over Ω. Such a probability measure has numerous interpretational advantages. For instance, the trader satisfies Monotonicity if and only if χ = 1, the distance between π 1 and π χ (as measured by Kullback-Leibler divergence of π 1 relative to π χ ) decreases with χ, and when actions a and b are perfectly correlated, the trader perceives their correlation coefficient to be χ. Also, this PCR has consistent marginal beliefs and q can be interpreted as the objective distribution on Ω. Suppose the trader is risk-neutral and considers purchasing a CDO. To make the example stark, assume that the CDO is a profile a n 1 , ..., a n n , where each a n i is a 1 n share of an asset a i , a n i ∈ C i for each i and n, and a i is "objectively" identical to a j : each a n i (ω) = 1 n a(ω) ≥ 0 for all ω and some fixed a ∈ A. As noted above, this trader correctly evaluates an untranched a n 1 , ..., a n n as exactly E q [a] . However, suppose the CDO is split into a senior and a junior tranche with a return of y claimed by the senior tranche, with returns evaluated using u J and u S . It is easy to show that this trader undervalues the junior tranche and overvalues the senior tranche and that such misvaluations are monotonic in n and χ. Thus, the senior tranche can be sold at a profit, with the junior tranche kept on the books. Furthermore, an investment bank could "repackage" the junior tranche to create a CDO-squared, or a CDO made up of CDOs (Coval et al., 2009 ). This trader would again overvalue the senior tranche of the synthetic CDO. However, a second trader who understands the correlation correctly could make arbitrage profits by shorting the senior tranche and going long on the junior (even without repackaging). Indeed, Lewis (2010) reports the story of a Morgan Stanley trader adopting the opposite trade strategy and losing over $9 billion.
Appendix A. Proofs not in main text
The following notation is used throughout. We denote the complement of a set E by E. We sometimes denote an element of F by F .
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1. Necessity is trivial.
Assume for the remainder that satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, Independence, and Weak Monotonicity. Herstein and Milnor (1953) implies that when restricted to the set of finite lotteries over X, has an expected utility representation with utility index u normalized such that u(0) = 0. The key step is to show that we can map each lottery over action profiles into a (utility valued) act on the state space Ω A . For any p ∈ ∆F, define the mapping
for every ω ∈ Ω A , where ω a i is the component of ω corresponding to action a i .
by the above. By f p ≥ f q , the last inequality is true. Since (x a ) was chosen arbitrarily, p plausibly dominates q. By Weak Monotonicity, p q. Then y = λ 1 x 1 −λ 2 x 2 , and since x 1 , x 2 ∈ W ⊂ W , y ∈ W ; hence W * ⊆ W . Suppose that λ 1 x 1 − λ 2 x 2 = y and y ∈ W . Then
Lemma 2. I has a positive linear extension F to the smallest subspace
Since x 1 , x 2 , y, 0 ∈ W , so are the LHS and RHS above. Linearity of I on W gives that I(y) = λ 1 I(x 1 ) − λ 2 I(x 2 ). So the function F = y → λ 1 I(x 1 ) − λ 2 I(x 2 ) whenever y = λ 1 x 1 − λ 2 x 2 is well-defined and extends I. Linearity of F follows from linearity of I. To see that F is a positive linear functional, fix φ ∈ W * with φ ≥ 0. Then
and since both the LHS and RHS are in U , F (
x 2 ). The remainder follows from linearity of F .
For any J ⊆ A, define Σ J = ⊗ a∈J σ(a), the product σ−algebra on Ω J and B 0 (Σ A ) the set of simple Σ A -measurable functions. Note that the set W * is a vector subspace of B 0 (Σ A ).
Lemma 3. There is a positive linear extensionF of F to all of
for a finitely additive probability measure
Proof. The function F is linear on W * and x ≥ 0 implies F (x) ≥ 0. Pick any y ∈ B 0 (Σ A ). Since y is bounded, let z be an upper bound for y. z is a constant so z ∈ W * . Hence W * majorizes B 0 (Σ A ). By Theorem 8.32 of Aliprantis and Border (2006) , F extends to a positive linear function on B 0 (Σ A ). By Theorem 14.4 of Aliprantis and Border (2006) , there is a finitely additive signed measure of bounded variation,
To see
with χ E (ω) = 1 for ω ∈ E and 0 otherwise, and since
finitely additive probability measure.
To construct a countably additive probability, for every finite J ⊆ A define a set function π J on (Ω J , Σ J ) using the formula
for every E ∈ Σ J . Each π J inherits finite additivity from π o ; in fact, since Σ J has a finite number of members, π J is countably additive and so a probability measure. By construction the family {π J } is Kolmogorov consistent. As a finite set, each Σ J is a compact class, and trivially 
Therefore the function U : ∆F → R defined by
represents the DM's preference. To conclude, rewrite U (p) as
the desired representation, which completes the proof.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2. We split the proof of Theorem 2 into three propositions. Supposing that has a basic correlation representation with continuous u, we apply Propositions 3 and 4 to yield that has a rich PCR if and only if Non-Singularity holds. The existence of a unique coarsest correlation cover follows from Proposition 3. Uniqueness of beliefs is follows from Proposition 5.
We say that the preference has a rich and understood correlation cover if there exists a correlation cover U such that every B in U is rich and understood.
Proposition 3. The preference satisfies Non-Singularity if and only if there exists a unique rich and understood correlation cover U such that any rich understood set C is contained in a set B ∈ U.
Proof of Proposition 3. Necessity is obvious. For sufficiency, let U be the set of all ⊆-maximal, rich and understood subsets. We show this is non-empty via Zorn's Lemma. Fix any chain {B t } t∈T of rich understood subsets of A. We claim that B * = t∈T B t is rich and understood and thus an upper bound by set inclusion. The set B * is understood because for any p, q ∈ ∆F, the set of actions included both in B * and in some profile in their support is finite. Thus, it is also contained in some understood B t and therefore considering only B * -synchronous plausible realizations suffice for preference between arbitrary p and q. Richness follows since, if a, b in B * , a, b ∈ B t for some t so for any f :
with c(ω) = f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω. By Zorn's lemma, there exists at least one maximal element. By Non-Singularity, each a belongs to at least one set B ∈ U. The claim then follows from ⊆-maximality. Proof of Proposition 4. Necessity is straightforward. For sufficiency, let U be a rich and understood correlation cover. Suppose that the preference relation has a basic representation ({a} a∈A , π 0 , u) with continuous u. We normalize so u(0) = 0. We show there exists π so that has rich PCR (U, π, u) ; the claim is trivial if u is constant, so that case is ignored. Suppose first that u is linear. Then with no loss of generality,
where π i is the marginal probability on Ω a corresponding action a i under π 0 . Using standard arguments, it is easy to verify that restricted to any B ∈ U has an affine representation V B where V B (a i ) = a i dπ B for some probability measure π B . It also clearly has an affine representation V (a i ). By uniqueness of affine representations,
Defining cross-class beliefs arbitrarily, for instance independently, delivers the result. Suppose now that u is not linear, so there exist x, y ∈ X such that
The proof proceeds as follows. First, we prove Lemma 4 showing that π 0 assigns zero probability to any collection of "small-stakes bets" in the same understanding class yielding "misaligned" outcomes. Second, for any profile, we construct a profile of such bets indifferent to it. Finally, we use these bet profiles to apply the arguments of Theorem 1 with Ω U replacing Ω A .
Throughout this case, we write N a for N copies of the action a, where N is a positive integer. For each B ∈ U, let {E
k=1 be the finest partition of Ω for which every action in B is measurable, and for x ∈ X choose an action β
k and 0 otherwise and define the corresponding event
Note such actions exist because B is rich. Let Θ ε be an open interval of size ε around 0 that excludes 0. We first prove two preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 4.
If there exist x, y ∈ X such that u(x + y) = u(x) + u(y), then there exists ε > 0 such that for every B ∈ U,
In words, Equation (1) implies that the DM believes it impossible that bets on distinct E i and E j in the same class pay off jointly; Equation (2) implies that if one bet on E i pays off, then all bets on E i in the same class pay off; and Equation (3) implies that from a set of bets on all events in a partition and contained in the same class, at least one bet pays off. In sum, within the same understanding class, all the bets on one and only one of the elements of its finest partition pay off jointly.
Proof of Lemma 4. Pick x , y ∈ X and fix B ∈ U. To save notation, we omit the dependence on B, i.e we write β E j,y , we have
and thus
If we can find non negative integers N, M ∈ N and z 0 ∈ X such that the term in brackets is not-zero, then (1) must hold. Without loss of generality, either x, y > 0, x, y < 0, or x > 0 > y and either x , y > 0, x , y < 0, or x > 0 > y . We have four cases: Since u is continuous, it is easy to verify by applying the appropriate case for z 0 that there exist ε > 0 such that x , y ∈ Θ ε implies that the absolute value of the term in brackets in (4) is sufficiently close to |u(x + y) − u(x) − u(y)| > 0 for some positive integers N and M . Conclude (1) holds.
To see (2), fix non-zero x , y ∈ Θ ε . Let b ∈ B be a bet yielding x on E i and 0 otherwise and define
By arguments analogous to the above,
by picking N such that u(z + N x ) = u(z) for some z ∈ R, we have
Such N and z must exist by continuity as long as u is not constant by choosing a possibly smaller value for ε in Θ ε . Plugging these into the inclusion-exclusion formula gives that
A symmetric argument with b defined using y instead of x yields (2). Consider any x 1 , ..., x K ∈ Θ ε , and choose y ∈ Θ ε and positive integer N so that u(N y) = 0. Since B is understood we have that
By (2) and the representation,
which gives (3).
Consider a lottery r. For each profile F = a j n j=1 in the support select a vector
The vector of profile allocations C
assigns each action in each profile that has a positive probability to an understanding class to which it belongs. Several allocations may be associated with the same r and thus severalf r 's are generated for it; since the DM is indifferent between r and itself, to save notation, we omit the dependence on the profile allocations of thef r 's generated for the same lottery. The remainder of the proof follows from the arguments in Theorem 1 if we show that, for any such maps, if for some choice of profile allocationsf p ≥f q then p q.
Lemma 5. Given any ε > 0 and profile
Proof. Statements (ii)-(iv) follow from the richness of each C F i . To see (i), note that because the preference understands C F 1 and of statement (ii), DM is indifferent between F and the profile obtained by replacing the actions in the set {a i : 
where each L j is either E j or E j . Fix any such D where π 0 (D) > 0 and ω ∈ D. The difference in expected utility of lottery p and q at the state ω ∈ D is
Since D has positive probability, by Lemma 4 there exists ω
Since D was arbitrary, U (p ) − U (q ) = D Γ(D)π 0 (D) ≥ 0 and p q , which in turn implies p q. Repeating the remaining steps of Theorem 1 completes the sufficiency proof. (U, π, u) and (U, µ, u) where u is continuous but not a polynomial, then π = µ.
Proposition 5. If has rich PCRs
Proof. Suppose that (U, π, u) and (U, µ, u) both represent the preference , and that u is continuous but not a polynomial. Let V π and V µ be the respective utility indexes. Say that an event E ∈ Σ U is a rectangle for {C 1 , ..., C n } if there are a i ∈ C i and E i ∈ σ (a i ) such that
The set of all rectangles is a π-system that generates the domain of π and µ, so if π(E) = µ(E) whenever E is a rectangle, then π = µ by Caratheodory. We show this by induction, relying on the following lemma. 
Proof. The claim follows by recursive substitutions, noting that
and
We claim that if E is a rectangle for B, then π(E) = µ(E). Proceed by induction on #B. The case of #B = 1 is standard since both PCRs are rich. Suppose that π(E ) = µ(E ) whenever E is a rectangle for B with #B ≤ N − 1. Let E be an arbitrary rectangle for {C 1 , ..., C N } ⊆ U, generated by E 1 , ..., E N where E i ∈ σ(a i ) for some a i ∈ C i .
Define the function Proof. It is easy to see that if has a basic representation, it has a PCR with U = {{a} : a ∈ A}. Suppose has a PCR (U, π, u). For every a ∈ A, choose C a ∈ U with a ∈ C a . Pick any B = {a 1 , ..., a n } ⊂ A. Define
where E i ∈ σ(a i ) for i = 1, ..., n. This π B is clearly a measure defined on the π-system that generates ⊗ n i=1 σ(a i ) and so can be uniquely extended to it. Moreover, the collection {π B } is Kolmogorov consistent and so by Kolmogorov's extension theorem, we can define π 0 on Σ A to agree with every π B . Thus has a basic correlation representation with probability π 0 and utility u.
For a PCR (U, π, u) and finite B ⊆ U, let π B denote the marginal distribution over the copies of Ω assigned to understanding classes in B. Note that the utility of any profile consisting of n actions is determined by some π B with #B ≤ n. Proof. Sufficiency follows from exactly the same arguments used in Thoerem 2. To see necessity, suppose that S N ( x) = 0 for all x and that π agrees with µ on any rectangle for B when #B < N − 1. Consider any profile a i m i=1 , and assume WLOG that each a i belongs to a distinct understanding class C i ; we show that for any x 1 , ..., x N . Now,
so by (6) where x i = a i (ω C i ), i = 1, ..., N − 1, and
can be written as the sum of utilities where each argument contains the sum of at most m − 1 terms. We can repeat this procedure until the arguments of each u (·) contain the sum of at most N − 1 terms. Naturally, the exact same procedure can be applied to V µ . This establishes the result.
